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The idea of national parks has long conjured particular images for people, from
the vast, majestic landscapes of Yellowstone, to the Park Service or possibly even
preservation. With the overwhelming mission statement of the 21st century National Park
Service, very few people know or even understand the troubled history behind the parks.
The following analysis focuses on Yosemite and Yellowstone National Park, not only
because of their popularity, but because they remain the oldest, largest, and most well
known establishments. The current battle between use and preservation of the parks
remains embedded in the histories of the two major parks, both which serve as
outstanding examples of policy failure driven by aesthetic and utilitarian use. Created
years before America was prepared to manage with the parks, changing attitudes and
perceptions regarding their purpose and use compromised the preservation of pristine
natural conditions, while the policies designed to protect the parks repeatedly failed.
Left essentially undefined, preservation was an unclear secondary objective to the use
and development of the parks.

National Parks Origins & Concepts: The Beginning
“…Which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the
wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”

March 1, 1872. A bill barely one page in length slipped quietly through Congress
in the early morning hours. Short as it was, the document—known as the Yellowstone
Park Act—marked the establishment of the first “national park”. In the following years,
the act remained largely obscure, meaning little to the average nineteenth century
American. Yet the Yellowstone Act of 1872 is often attributed with the immense role of
having paved the way for changes in societal perceptions of nature and government
policy towards wilderness preservation. Unfortunately, time revealed the act to be
nothing more than a dedication of land—an outline of public land use based on utilitarian
principles. Established years before America knew how to deal with the parks, emphasis
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was placed on development rather than “unimpaired” preservation—the later remaining
unclear and all too often, undefined. These policies, or lack thereof, subjected national
parks to decades of abuse, vandalism, and exploitation, leaving in its wake a long history
of failure. However, the importance of these policy failures is reflected in the mere fact
that the parks were established—and survived—at all.
Instead of the momentous and radical policy change it was thought to represent,
the 1872 Yellowstone Act remained almost a “historic anomaly rather than a trendsetter
in public land policy”1, an assertion maintained by National Park Service historian
Richard Sellars. Yellowstone and Yosemite Parks represent what Sellars referred to as
the “cooperative effort between government and private business to use the resources of
the publicly owned lands, particularly in the West.”2 These two parks, along with those
created afterwards, suffered from lack of funding, administrative corruption, poor
management, and unprecedented blunders in preservation science. At the core of these
problems lay the vague and undefined policies, which were frequently subjected to a
variety of interpretations. The Yellowstone and Yosemite Park Act both specifically
called for the preservation of “all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or
wonders,” ultimately retained “in their natural condition”.3 Yet these key provisions went
undefined, allowing the lack of explanation and the inadequacy of the policies to create a
vacuum of ambiguity—later to be filled by self-interests and greed.
The 1800s proved to be pivotal years in United States, during which America’s
preconceptions of nature and wilderness underwent dramatic changes. Having recently
1

Richard West Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks (London: Yale
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2
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Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, (London: Yale University Press,
2001), 113.
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acquired its independence from Europe, America was a young country struggling to
maintain its nationhood against the impressive past of the former. 21st century historian
Roderick Frederick Nash argued that the “short history, weak traditions, and minor
literary and artistic achievements” were poor comparisons against the rich backdrop of
Europe.4 As a result, Americans pressed for a new set of standards by which they could
justify their nationhood—wilderness.
The emergence of a new definition of “American” based on the idea of the
nation’s unmatched wilderness enabled the country to feel unique and worthy of its new,
although short, heritage.5 Wilderness was the embodiment of America, a physical
symbol of the pioneer’s struggle and the battle between good (civilization) and bad
(wilderness). 18th century perceptions of nature as “solitary, mysterious, and chaotic”—
words that once connotated negative images of wilderness—were now coveted as being
crucial and defining American characteristics.6 Decades later in 1890, Frederick Jackson
Turner recaptured America’s focus on its identity when he published a groundbreaking
article in which he claimed the frontier was closed. America had finally been civilized,
and the endless wilderness that was once thought impossible to completely inhabit was
now undeniably limited in expanse. The realization that the crucial and defining symbol
of American democracy and lifestyle was suddenly gone, compromised by the endless
expansion of cities and populace, resulted in national parks being once again seen as
sources for renewal and enjoyment.7
4
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21st century historian Alfred Runte suggested this “scenic nationalism” not only
drove Americans to seek a distinct standard of equality, but further enflamed a growing
fascination in landscape art. This interest in national scenery produced a new surge of
awareness for the currently existing Romantic Movement, an art style in which intense
emphasis was placed on exceptional wonders or natural curiosities. Focus shifted
towards landscapes that were unduplicated elsewhere in the world—the high, rugged
mountains and valleys, “colossal and full of savage grandeur” in character.8 With the
formation of the Hudson River School of Art years earlier in 1825, American painters
such as Thomas Cole (also the school’s founder), Albert Bierstadt, Thomas Moran, and
Frederic Church had already begun to step away from simply mimicking European
subject matter in order to focus on the panoramic depictions of the Great West.9 Often
exaggerated and embellished, the landscape paintings nonetheless helped increase the
public desire to not only see, but reserve, these natural wonders for future enjoyment.
In spite of this overwhelming and sudden desire, the new fascination with scenic
landscapes left wilderness virtually ignored, neglected by the persistent hunt for
“exquisite wonders”. These “novelties of rare and curious character” accumulated and
retained immense value as being worthy of protection, while subsequent appreciation for
common nature diminished.10 Initial advocates of scenic nationalism were largely
unconcerned with substandard nature, and “acted to prevent private acquisition and
exploitation of geysers, hot springs, waterfalls, and similar curiosities.” Any preservation
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of wilderness happened unintentionally.11 Based on their retention of the world’s finest
pictorial landscapes, the parks were destined to serve one purpose: to become the nation’s
playgrounds, “without any rival in the world.”12 Described as “wonderful freaks of
physical geography,” the parks became the center of a battle between use and
preservation.
It is important to momentarily pause and comprehend the dynamics of this shift
from wilderness as a bad entity and the push for private ownership of land, to the
incredible fascination with nature and desire to preserve it. This unprecedented
development occurred during a period of time when the United States government
realized that excessive, unclaimed land was worthless and unprofitable. What ensued
were large scale attempts to place public land into the hands of private individuals,
primarily through tools such as homesteading acts, mining and timber laws, and railroad
grants. During what is referred to as the Disposal Era, the government successfully
distributed millions of acres of land to private owners. Although designating
Yellowstone as a park ultimately removed it from any private ownership, the potential
economic benefits of tourism and enterprises within the park were sufficient enough to
legitimize the proposal. The goal of the United States government was to open the
parklands to public visitors and provide them access and accommodation, both made
possible through private companies interested in competing for marketable prospects.13
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It may have been the 19th century painter George Catlin who first dreamed of the
park idea nearly fifty years before the creation of Yellowstone when, in 1832, he
proposed a “magnificent park” complete with Indians, buffaloes, and wilderness.14 While
Catlin’s park was nothing like those eventually established, the concept of reserving land
for recreation and use was clearly gaining momentum. Thirty years later, concrete efforts
were under way to set aside fifteen miles of valley land set deep within Yosemite,
California. Already with their sights on the land, entrepreneurs, gold prospectors, and
squatters threatened to destroy the pristine virtue of the valley, while inconsistencies
within federal land laws simultaneously made the valley an easy target for private
interests. After witnessing first-hand the valley’s threatened stability Israel Ward
Raymond, the California state representative for the Central American Steamship Transit
Company of New York, set a letter on February 20, 1864 to California Senator John
Conness, in which he urged the preservation of Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa Grove
as a state reserve.15 Within his letter, Raymond stressed that such a reservation be
“inalienable”, a term that would remain at the core of the national park image. The bill
proposal, rewritten and embellished by Conness, directly played off the growing need for
American pride and patriotism, and on June 30, 1864, President Abraham Lincoln signed
the Yosemite Park Act into effect.
However important as it was, Yosemite Park merely underscored the significance
of Yellowstone, the “first” national park dedicated eight years later.16 Not surprisingly,
prospectors and industrial companies found the idea of permanently reserving a tract of
14
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land and making it inaccessible extremely undesirable. Such use of invaluable resources
was wasteful, especially within the context of a rapidly developing nation. Regardless,
Yosemite Valley had succeeded in being “held for public use, resort and recreation,” and
left “inalienable for all time.”17 The purpose of such reservation was clear—to provide
for the public a recreational ground for all classes and stature in life. Unfortunately, the
legislative bill for Yosemite Park lacked reference to monetary appropriations or, more
importantly, regulations for how the “park” was to be managed. It was merely an
assurance that public persons would have access to such magnificent features.
With Yosemite Valley established as a state park, the enthusiasm for national
parks waned over the next five years. Finally, in 1869 the first of three expeditions to
Yellowstone made its pivotal trip. Hoping to confirm the rumors spreading in the East of
Yellowstone’s incredible scenery, a man by the name of Charles W. Cook set out with
several men on a private enterprise. His journal, complete with a list of necessary
provisions (including a pick ax for prospecting), concluded with one of the first
predictions of Yellowstone as being “broken by crowds of pleasure seekers which at no
distant day will throng its shores.”18 Nathanial P. Langford and Henry D. Washburn led
the second private expedition in 1870, only to be followed by the final and most famous
excursion in 1871. Under the guidance of Ferdinand Vandiveer Hayden, director of the
Geological and Geographical Survey of the Territories, the last expedition was the corner
stone in furthering Yellowstone as a national “pleasuring-ground.” Strictly official, the
expedition was under scientific and military orders by the U.S. Government to report any
17
18

Yosemite Act. 13 Stat. 325, 38th Cong., 30 June 1864.
Charles W. Cook, The Valley of the Upper Yellowstone: An Exploration of the Headwaters of
the Yellowstone River in the Year 1869, Ed. Aubrey L. Haines, (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1965), 40.

8

and all discoveries or findings. Hayden later claimed that it was he who made the
original suggestion that the park become a national arena, a proposition that he deemed to
be a “natural…unavoidable proposal.”19
However, the “preservation” of Yellowstone was not an important issue. In fact,
the concept of preservation was largely unknown in the 19th century and did not become a
major factor until well into the 1900s. As an agent acting on behalf of the United States
government, Hayden may have been responding to the growing enthusiasm for free
enterprise. Albert Peale, a mineralogist accompanying the expedition, also kept a faithful
journal in which he suggested that it “[required] no stretch of the imagination to see this
place in the near future thronged with invalids drinking this water and bathing in it for
their health.”20 Each of the expedition’s members believed “the land around them would
soon be taken up by private interests and that the beautiful formations would be carried
off for mercenary purposes”. The only solution was government control.21
Hayden and Langford clearly could not have convinced Congress of the need for
a national park by themselves. At their side was the beneficial help of the railroad
companies, all too eager to lend their services through lavish offers of development for
purposes of tourism and economic means. If national parks were established, efficient
means of transportation would be necessary in order to enable visitors the chance to see
the great wonders of America. The potential for economic revenue by means of tourism
struck a chord with Congress, who perceived Yellowstone as an “enchanted island” of
public resorts and spas where people would be able to escape the chaotic, noisy, busy
19
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world and enjoy the carefree, refreshing landscape.22 Aesthetics became an important
factor, and advocates of the park pointed out the use of thermal springs as being healing
centers of medicine for the sick and invalid, while the tourist, scientist and foreigner
could revel in the park’s objects of interest as a source of “health, amusement, and
instruction” for all.23 Yellowstone was en route to becoming the ideal image of a
“Romantic” landscape, a gathering ground for all ages, classes, and economic pools.24
By 1872, two major impediments stood in the way of the creation of Yellowstone
National Park, blocking its progress through Congressional legalities. The first obstacle
was the general awareness of possible economic value within the Yellowstone location.
Early park supporters perceived the discomfort Congress felt at the idea of reserving land
that held potential for mining, logging, or other beneficial industries. Tourism became
park supporters’ strongest reason for reserving Yellowstone, a clear attempt to
compensate for any loss of economic worth of the land itself.25 In support of the park
advocates were the railroad companies, who understood that if Yellowstone was reserved
for tourism, methods of transportation would be vital. For railroad companies,
Yellowstone held potential as the next Niagara Falls or Saratoga Springs, and stood to be
sources of great economic profit.26 Yet park advocates needed to prove Yellowstone was
devoid of significant economic value, and their best strategy was not to simply “justify
the park as positively wilderness, but to demonstrate its uselessness to civilization.”27
22

Nash, 16.
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Those in favor of opening the land for resource exploitation had to be convinced that the
park lacked worth, with “nothing of any value” to be found in Yellowstone.28 In his letter
to the Secretary of the Interior in 1873, Superintendent Langford recorded, “there is no
land in the park suitable for agricultural purposes…no mines have yet been discovered,
and it is in the general opinion…that none will be found within the limits of the park.”29
Almost twenty years later, Muir used the same approach in his description of Yosemite
Valley as land not “valuable for any other use than the use of beauty.”30 Economic
worthlessness played a significant factor in determining the fate of Yellowstone and
Yosemite National Park.31
The second major impediment was the issue of monetary appropriations. Once
convinced Yellowstone lacked any significant value the 42nd Congress, later responsible
for signing the Yellowstone Act, still hesitated to pass the park bill should it eventually
require additional funds and government aid. Yellowstone supporters were forced to
convince legislators that no requests for monetary aid would be made, and the lands in
question retained no other value except for recreational or tourism purposes. In a letter
written in 1878 to the Secretary of the Interior, Hayden recalled being “compelled to give
a distinct pledge that [he] would not apply for an appropriation for several years or least.
Had not Congress been assured that no demands would be made upon them for annual
appropriations, it is doubtful whether the Yellowstone bill would have become a law.”32
Although the Yellowstone Act was finally passed on March 1, 1872, it was only after
28
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Congress was entirely convinced that “no additional public burden was to be incurred
thereby.”33 With the heavy assumption that the new park would be completely selfsupporting, Yellowstone was left to fend for itself, fated to sink under the weight of an
insufficient management system. Lacking funds, “one [wondered] that it survived at
all.”34
With these two major impediments in mind, the rhetoric used in the Yellowstone
and Yosemite Acts openly reflected the attitudes and perceptions towards parks in the
19th century. Both only a page in length, the acts called for the parks to serve as a
“public…pleasuring-ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people”, with emphasis
placed on the parks as tourist attractions. The Department of the Interior vigilantly stated
the goal of the parks was not “to beautify or adorn [the] reservation, but merely to
preserve from injury or spoliation the timber, mineral deposits, and various curiosities of
that region, so far as possible in their natural condition.”35 Without explaining what
“natural condition” implied, intentions for Yosemite and Yellowstone remained centered
on development for public use, serving to stimulate the mental and physical well being of
American citizens.36
Resembling that of the Yosemite Park Act, the lands of Yellowstone Park were
also “reserved and withdrawn from the settlement, occupancy, or sale”37 (referring
primarily to the acquisition of the land by private individuals). Located in parts of
Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho, Yellowstone Park encompassed over two million acres—

33
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making it the largest national park ever created. Compared to the mere fifteen miles of
Yosemite Valley, Yellowstone was an unprecedented reservation of land. Yet 21st
century critics suggest that Hayden specifically included nearly three times the mass of
the first park not because of “wilderness preservation, but…from the feeling that there
might be other ‘decoration’ as yet undiscovered in the vicinity of the known ones.”38
These similarities and lax interpretations of the two park acts demonstrated the
inability of the United States government to foresee, or even comprehend, the amount of
care and management required by such reservations. Through an incredible sequence of
events, the national park idea evolved before the country was prepared to undertake the
responsibility assumed with such a daunting task. As a result, the lack of definition and
guidelines subjected both territories to an explosion of problems over the next fifty years.

Problems Within the Parks: Yosemite and Yellowstone
The lack of funding proved to be the biggest problem for Yellowstone and
Yosemite Parks, and further provided a foundation for other issues within the park
system. Left intentionally out of the park acts, the issue of appropriations was not a
concern for Congress. Funds for Yellowstone and Yosemite were nonexistent well into
the 1880s, resulting in destructive activities such as vandalism and spoliation to remain
unhindered. One year after Yellowstone’s creation Nathaniel P. Langford, one of the
original park proponents and the first National Park Superintendent of Yellowstone,
regretfully acknowledged that the intentions set in the Act of March 1, 1872 were

38
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impossible to perform without monetary aid.39 Again in 1874, Langford complained that
no appropriations had been made “for the purpose of opening the park to the public and
of enabling [the] Department to carry into effect the necessary rules and regulations for
its government.”40 Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, park administrators and promoters
delivered constant please to Congress, requesting for the most “moderate sum” in order to
give the administration “a start as well as greater executive power” with which to carry
out its tasks.41 Under the assumption and promise that the parks were to remain nonreliant upon governmental aid, Congress repeatedly hesitated, referring to the first request
for appropriations on March 1, 1875 as simply “too early”.42 Without funding to make the
necessary changes, Yellowstone and Yosemite Park conditions slumped.
Three more years passed until finally, on June 13, 1878, Congress agreed to
furnish $10,000.00 to “protect, preserve, and improve the Yellowstone National Park.”43
The amount was still far too small to be of sufficient use, and park visitor’s continued to
express their “[disgust] with the physical conditions that [prevailed] in some of [the
parks].” A testament to the worsening conditions, these complaints subsequently placed
the blame for such detriment on the park system and country as a whole.44
Superintendents fervently denied their responsibility in the problem, submitting that any
39
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failure or worsening condition within the parks was not an administrative
responsibility—so long as there was no money to be applied for the correction of such
problems.45 Responsibility for such neglect and spoliation rested on Congressional
failure to take necessary action in ensuring the provisions contemplated in the Act of
March 1, 1872 were completed.46
Nonetheless, early park administrations were stained with a sense of
ineffectiveness, a problem only magnified by the lack of funds. Left without a choice
except to ignore the increasing problems, park superintendents turned a blind eye to those
which they could do nothing about—most notably vandalism, poaching, theft, and
resource exploitation. Compounded with the administrators’ own lack of salaried pay,
the absence of funds made the job frustrating and susceptible to corruptive tendencies.
The “separate and distinct unit” of administrations within the parks allowed for a higher
frequency of irregularities in enforcement and regulations, depending largely upon the
park’s immediate superintendent.47 Visitor complaints continued to fall upon the deaf
ears of powerless superintendents, and the growing “disappointment and resentment” felt
by tourists was effective only as far as economics were concerned. Public criticism of
flawed park management helped push for better visitor accommodation, not for better
preservation standards.48
Unfortunately, corruption within the early park system was not an unusual
phenomenon. Acting as a “body of police, styled assistant superintendents” were just as
inefficient as they were fraudulent. “Creatures of political favoritism,” the
45
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superintendents, unused to the services required of them, often “made merchandise of the
treasures which they were appointed to preserve.”49 Exceptionally unsuited and untrained
for the job of managing a park, several civilian superintendents made it their personal
goal to transfer parklands into the hands of private individuals. Robert E. Carpenter, one
of the most notorious superintendents of Yellowstone Park, spent his two years as
administrator by pushing for such private ownership, making it clear that the protection
and improvement of the park were “matters of secondary considerations.”50
With the arrival of the United States Army in Yellowstone shortly after, the hope
of controlling corruptive tendencies became slightly more optimistic. However, the army
was no less susceptible to fraudulent activity as were the previous park administrators.
They, too, were faced with inexistent funds, lack of pay, and more importantly, boredom.
High levels of corruptive and illegal activity, primarily a result of the “necessarily
decentralized nature of law enforcement of the park”, reflected the men’s constant
isolation while on duty.51 Soldiers were frequently “absolutely unfamiliar with the
country and their duties as game wardens,” a problem that extended throughout much of
the park system’s history.52
The third largest problem proved to be a direct result of the ambiguous park
guidelines. Monopolistic companies and private enterprises moved into the parks and
assumed control over large portions of the land at a time when the push for development
was at its height. Surprisingly, these companies were able to legally do so through the
49
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park acts, which allowed individuals to enter contracts granting them the right to use
parklands for the purpose of commercial growth in Yosemite and Yellowstone Park.
Regulated monopoly, often disguised under the interests of park development for public
uses, was a vital part of the Congressional “theory of competition,” and viewed as a
necessary and beneficial system through which development could occur.53 Early
promoters of Yellowstone and Yosemite expected to support the parks through funds
derived from leases accrued, an assumption that rationalized Congress’s encouragement
of railroad and hotel companies to be the first enterprises to reside in the parks. It was
believed that their actions, if motivated by self-interest, would actually help enhance the
development and management of natural resources.
By the 1880s, the parks remained severely underdeveloped, inaccessible, and too
extensive for a few people to successfully manage without assistance. Over the next few
decades, the parks were victimized by the emergence of two basic utilitarian principles:
tourism and public recreation, both funded and supported by the railroad and hotel
industries who took advantage of the need for development. Under the pretense of
developing the parks for public benefit, the railroad companies offered their assistances
in the form of major transportation reforms. The Yellowstone Park Improvement
Company was one of many major participants who took advantage of the “rare
opportunity” presented to parties—an opportunity in which they could “exploit the
government for their private emolument under the generous guise of improving the park
and catering to the comfort of the tourist.”54 Encouraged by the park administration, hotel
53
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businesses followed suit and began to build lavish visitor accommodations. Both major
enterprises operated under the objective of putting “as many [railroads and hotels] as
[they] could in there.”55 Not to be outdone, the logging and mining companies also
competed for use of the parks to feed their consumptive appetite for natural resources.56
In 1886, the Yellowstone Park Association took over the bankrupt Yellowstone
Park Improvement Company, and signed a lease intended to be effective until 1892. The
clause of the lease enabled the company to use bricks, quarry stone, and use any dead or
fallen timber in the park—so long as a faithful record was kept. It also granted the
company the right to install utility pipes, erect and maintain telegraph and telephone
poles, and use the grasses for livestock grazing. Although these provisions were only to
be done as necessary to accommodate guests and other persons, the company subjected
the lease to lax interpretation and abuse.57 The lease made it clear that nothing was to be
done that would prevent the public’s access to any geyser or object of curiosity in the
park.58 Based largely on the honor system, the Yellowstone Park Association lease
allowed the company to exercise unrestricted use of the parklands.
While the aforementioned companies proved to be several of the largest
monopolies at the turn of the 20th century, these corporations amounted to little under the
National Park Transportation Association. After acquiring the right to be the sole
transportation company entering and leaving Yellowstone, the National Park
Transportation Association went so far as to guarantee that no visitor would “subjected to
the hazard and inconvenience of walking over any portion of the journey through the
55
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park.”59 The Northern Pacific Railroad (NPR), another major railroad company,
repeatedly sought the exclusive right to trade corridors within the park boundaries.60
Like the others, the NPR heartedly endorsed private enterprise and emphasized the need
for park development in order to better accommodate visitors and boost economic
profits.61 With one foot firmly in the door, railroad companies quickly gained the upper
hand and took advantage of a system lacking sufficient rules, regulations, and policies
effective in preserving the parks.
Simultaneously, the increasing number of privately owned lands within the parks
quickly became a problem equivalent to those presented by monopolies. Still legally
sanctioned under both the Yellowstone and Yosemite Park Acts, the detriment accrued by
individual homesteaders expanded alongside large-scale private interests. Subsequent
companies (which included mining, water projects, and individual enterprises) subjected
the parks to a continuous onslaught of “sabotage bills”, proposals that called for new
transportation lines, mines, and dams. Such enterprises began to “seriously interfere with
the proper administration of the parks and [impaired] their usefulness and beauty in many
ways.”62 The existence of such holdings had profound effects on the parklands well into
the 1900s, causing tourism conditions to become hazardous while decreasing visitor
enjoyment.63 No changes were made to alter the park acts, allowing individuals to
maintain their access to leases within the parks. Such oversight on behalf of the park
system helped quicken the deterioration of the parks’ conditions. Compounded with
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ineffective guidelines and easily manipulated leases, private interests and their contracts
were major contributors to the detriment of the park system.
It is important to note that the lack of immediate change regarding private
interests was primarily a result of the political spectrum in the late 1800s and early 1900s.
Any restriction of potentially exploitative political agendas posed a threat to voting
numbers and the ability to sway decisions in Congressional issues. These moral conflicts
found within individual interests paved the road for bad “preservation” techniques, and
often promoted the degradation of the environment. William Kent, an influential
congressman in the early 20th century, was one of the many individuals in Congress who
was governed by self-interest. Kent opposed the growing campaign that sought to ban
livestock grazing in the parks, and offered the argument that grazing actually produced
beneficial effects by reducing the foliage responsible for forest fires.64 However, it was
well known that Kent’s personal ranch in Nevada, along with several of his rancher
friends, depended on their ability to graze their livestock on parklands. Without this
resource, the ranching businesses held by Kent and his friends would be threatened and
significantly impaired.65 Personal agendas in the political spectrum were not uncommon
and merely reflected the political scheme surrounding the parks in the 19h century.
The corruptive, weak administrative system coupled with the explosion of
monopolies within the park establishments merely reflected another problem set within
the park system. While the Yellowstone Park Act specifically stated that offenses and
violations were to be reprimanded, the park system lacked any sort of policy providing
64
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for the legal jurisdiction of its effective protection. The minimal seasonal control under
which the parks were supervised and the inability to apply proper jurisdiction allowed the
violations within the park to continue unhindered.66 During a 1912 hearing for the
proposed Bureau of National Parks, the Secretary of the Interior reported that early
administrations suffered from “necessarily limited” supervision, and that “considerable
difficulty [had] been experienced in protecting the monuments from vandalism,
unauthorized exploration and spoliation.”67 Notable depredation of wild game from
hunting and poaching, increased liquor sales, robbery, and vandalism continued
unchecked, in part because of the untrained civil officers who were neither experienced in
managing parks or had the legal capacity to act on the law enforcement aspect.68 For
several years, the “cautious and prudent Congress” turned their heads from the legal
jurisdiction problem.69 Congress finally passed a bill on June 2, 1920, which provided
park administrators with the legal and judicial machinery to punish offenses committed
within a national park—a provision that was originally called for almost fifty years
earlier.70
Within the decade following the establishment of Yellowstone National Park,
Yosemite and Yellowstone were placed at the center of a heated battle. Preservation, still
an uncommon concept, was drastically overshadowed by the desire to use the parks for
public recreation and enjoyment. It was clear, however, that the conditions of the parks
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were unacceptable and threatened to further disgrace the country. The need for drastic
change was imminent.

The Need for Change: 1880-1930
The escalating problems occurring in the parks and their deteriorating conditions
demanded attention. Lack of funds and efficient force had catapulted the administration,
and its policies, into extreme failure. Public concerns were repeatedly raised, drawing
attention to the necessity of immediate action and lawful force to prevent vandalism from
destroying the parks. The United States Army proved to be the only systematic legal
force readily available. Although Congress granted national park superintendents the
legal capacity to call upon the Department of War for the purpose of sending cavalry
troops to Yellowstone and Yosemite Park in 1883, the bill was not enacted until 1886.
The length of the army’s supervisory role was intended to be temporary; yet once in the
parks the U.S. Army authorized complete control until the creation of the National Park
Service in 1916. Secretary of the Interior John W. Noble foresaw the extent of the
problems in the park system, and predicted the army would be kept in the parks for
longer than expected when, in 1890, he “[expressed] the opinion that there will probably
be need for troops in…[Yellowstone] for some time to come to protect the reservation
from trespassers and the persons and property of visitors from violence at the hands of
lawless characters who may be tempted to resort thereby the reason of the fact that no
organized civil authority for the enforcement of civil law has been established there.”71
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Thus, U.S. Army Captain Moses Harris, one of the few early preservation
enthusiasts, relieved the civilian Yellowstone Park superintendent on August 20, 1886.
With the army stationed in the park, Captain Harris brought about as many changes as his
power allowed. Harris pushed for the full revision, extension, printing and posting of all
park regulations for public viewing, while the soldiers helped curb petty offenses—
primarily trespassing and firestarting—by making such crimes unprofitable for the
offender.72 However, there were “no laws defining offenses and their punishment”, and
the few that did exist were grossly “inadequate for the protection of timber, curiosities,
game, etc.”73 In fact, no law was created for the purposes of legal protection until 1905,
when a simple act was passed that allowed park employees to arrest any persons
responsible for committing an offense in the employee’s presence.74 However, prior to
1905 the army’s efforts were restricted by the lack of judicial machinery under which to
act with authority. Hampered by Congress, the soldiers were hardly more qualified to be
“acting superintendents” than their civilian counterparts.75
Five years after the army arrived in Yellowstone, Secretary Noble asked Captain
A.E. Wood of the United States Calvary to become acting superintendent of Yosemite
National Park on May 19, 1891.76 With their hands also tied by legalities, the soldiers in
Yosemite Park were subjected to the same lax attitudes in their duty to protect nature.
During the army’s park administration, superintendents developed two main approaches
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to “preserving natural conditions”: “to ignore or to manipulate.”77 The soldiers in both
Yellowstone and Yosemite instituted fire-prevention techniques and introduced exotic
species into their management of the national parks, while simultaneously beginning
extensive efforts to control current, undesirable animal species. Predator reduction—the
systematic extermination of all unwanted or disliked animals within the park—became a
defining policy that lasted into the late 1920s. Park officers were encouraged to sell any
pelts or hides from the animals they killed—actions that were sanctioned under the clause
“improvement of the park systems.”78 The hunting of game and other profitable
enterprises served as frequent pastimes of soldiers, which was all to often a response to
the tediousness of their jobs.
While 21st century environmental preservationists have not always praised the
army’s administration for bringing the most successful or beneficial change, their
presence in the park did represent the first acknowledgment of the need for a systematic
and tangible legal force within park boundaries. Unfortunately, the army’s departure left
the parks unprotected, and grazing and vandalism returned. Their presence had not
furthered preservation efforts, and 21st century preservationists speculate it may have
actually done more damage to the condition of the environment. Nonetheless, the
tumultuous 1890s brought a clear warning that the army’s presence was not enough to
protect the parks, and more effective change was imminent and necessary.
Although inconsistent and infrequent, emerging interests in nature and wildlife
became apparent during the late 19th century after repeated proposals by railroad and
mining industries to build new transportation lines through Yellowstone (thereby
77
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reducing its size) were rejected by Congress. From 1880 to 1890 several critical acts
were passed in efforts to further preservation awareness, but each failed to initiate
noticeable progress when compounded against multiple contradictory acts. Created
primarily for the protection of birds and animals in Yellowstone, the Lacey Act, signed
into effect on May 7, 1894, also provided for the punishment of criminal action within
park borders. In the same year, the Hayes Act indirectly compromised the previous bill
by reaffirming the Superintendent’s right to grant leases within the park without
excluding public access. The emerging concept of proper park management was
repeatedly destroyed by subsequent legal actions. The Lacey Act, like others, represented
a positive step towards preservation awareness but its progress was just as quickly
undone. The interest in wildlife remained limited to the aspects enjoyed most by the
visiting public, allowing the “far distant” and “wild country” of Yellowstone to serve as a
primary example of park neglect based on management criteria that relied on legislative
action and money alone.
The beginning of the 20th century offered little consolation to park advocates still
searching for sound and adequate management while the fluctuation of progress in
preservation awareness continued. When the Antiquities Act was signed in 1906, it
provided the government with the ability to preserve land and historical monuments—
such as Devil’s Tower reserved in 1907—for scientific purposes. Unfortunately at the
same time, the act failed to change the ownership policy of the newly reserved land, and
left any new parks under the control of the original department. By overlooking this
major detail, the unequal and unsystematic distribution of land throughout various

25

governmental departments continued to inflict major problems in efficient park
management.
As the 1900s came to a close, park administrators felt a much greater pressure to
develop the parks than had been experienced in previous years, but the public demands
for additional, improved roads and adequate facilities were met with a system lacking the
capacity to provide equal and uniform development. The thirteen parks that comprised
the park system were managed on an individual basis, making equal development and
funding for the major parks, especially Yosemite and Yellowstone, impossible. Only an
organized function with the ability to retain “immediate and direct control to remedy the
evils” could bring about the necessary change.79 Unfortunately from 1900 to 1910,
Yellowstone and Yosemite Park superintendents were forced to compete against
government attention and aid currently directed towards irrigation and dam projects, as
well as battle proposals to extend winter grazing and notorious incompetent political
concessionaires who had hounded the parks since the 19th century.
Administrative officials, under pressure to develop the parks, began to propose
creating a separate government bureau under which the national parks would be placed.
The current system of disconnected parks and their uncoordinated superintendents was,
as stated by Secretary of the Interior Walter Lowrie Fisher, “more or less an accident.”80
The “ineffective and clumsy and awkward” method devised by the government for
handling such affairs was “chaotic,” leaving administrators and the Secretary of the
Interior feeling “handicapped” and overwhelmingly embarrassed by the lack of necessary
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machinery.81 By 1912, park supervision was still uncentralized, with effective change
possible only if the parks were “grouped together, under a single administrative bureau
specifically charged with such work.”82
More importantly, behind this push for organized development stood the ugly
truth—organized or not, the parks were going to be developed. It is interesting to note
that several of the most defining moments of administrative policy failure directed at
development emerged during the same years as the push for the National Park Service.
The Hetch Hetchy Valley of Yosemite National Park had, like its sister parks, managed to
withstand large-scale attempts for development. Repeated attacks to use the vast park
resources were nothing new, including numerous government recommendations in 1904
and 1905 to remove certain Yosemite mineral deposit areas from protection.83 Yet each
time Congress withdrew small and seemingly insignificant portions of the national
parklands for resource exploitation, they opened the doors for larger efforts demanding
access to the protected resources of Yosemite and Yellowstone. Finally on September
24, 1913, after nearly twelve years of struggle, Congress passed the Raker Act, which
authorized the city of San Francisco the right to build a dam and reservoir on the
Tuolumne River in the Hetch Hetchy Valley. Done in response to the growing need for a
municipal water supply for residential areas, the loss of Hetch Hetchy Valley symbolized
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the futile fight against the utilitarian demands of the country.84 The opposing campaign
was directed by John Muir, whose revolutionary transcendentalist beliefs led him to
believe that nature had intrinsic value—a quality that could not be undermined by public
use and development. Although Muir was never completely associated with Yellowstone
National Park, his valiant efforts to protect Yosemite National Park proved to be vital in
delaying its piecemeal dismemberment. Although the public arena realized the
magnitude of this loss only in hindsight, the failure of national park policy to protect the
parklands fortunately helped bring the need for “effective administration” one step closer
to reality.85
The most ironic aspect to this tragic history, however, was the parallel emergence
of the National Park Service campaign, which, under the guidance of Stephen T. Mather,
had started two years earlier in 1911. A strong environmental proponent, Mather was
swayed by a utilitarian outlook of natural resources. He emphasized the use of 19th
century rhetoric when describing the importance of national parks, transforming them
into meccas of “wonderful scenery, geysers, boiling springs…mountains, magnificent
waterfalls… brilliant-hued and ice-sculptured canyons,” complete with wild and strange
animals.86 Mather’s use of descriptive imagery further mandated the double standard of
use and preservation, however obscure the latter concept remained.87
Extremely visitor oriented, Mather focused on creating successful venues for
recreational tourism, which later resulted in the advertisement of parks as centers of
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outdoor seasonal sports, including activities such as hiking, fishing, skiing, camping,
dancing, golfing, and swimming.88 The objective of the to-be bureau was to promote
recreation, and in doing so, remained strong in anti-preservation practices; less was done
for the scenic-based preservation of natural resources and wilderness than was for the
economic boom in recreational tourism.89 Mather’s utilitarian influence carried over into
his young protégé, Horace M. Albright, who during times of Mather’s unstable health
continued the Secretary’s push for the creation of a National Park Service.
Economics and efficiency played a significant role in determining the future of a
national park bureau, proving once again to be constant themes in national park history.
The Forest Service, led by Gifford Pinchot, sided with Congress on its disapproval for a
National Park Service based on an economical standpoint. As Director of the Forest
Service and a large advocate of conservation, Pinchot was convinced that any systematic
management of the national parks would encroach on the forestry domain. The new
bureau threatened to seize lands previously held under the Forest Service and in doing, so
remained a potential rival vying for the same attention and limited funds from the
government.90
Congress, too, had its reservations. Much like the 42nd Congress of 1872, the 64th
Congress was deeply reluctant to establish a bureau that would require money from an
already hurting economy, and faced similar questions of how much money could be
spared on such a project. Indeed, the national parks were often the first place to forgo
expenditures on. In the 1912 House Committee on Public Lands hearing concerning the
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establishment of the National Park Service, Secretary Fisher convincingly testified that
the “additional expense of administration would not be as much as it would be under the
[current] hap-hazard system,” particularly if developmental aspects were taken into
consideration.91 Regardless, the debate over economics had reached such intensity that
by 1914, President William Howard Taft had coined the phrase “Utility involves
expense.” 92 The first of his letters supporting a National Park Service was written in
1911, when he delivered a message to Congress earnestly recommending the bureau’s
establishment as “essential to the proper management of those wondrous manifestations
of nature so startling and so beautiful that everyone [recognized] the obligation of the
Government to preserve them.” The President later added that such a bureau was
necessary “for the edification and recreation of the people.”93
On August 25, 1916, after its long struggle for approval by Congress, President
Woodrow Wilson signed the National Park Service Act into effect. For the first time
since their creation, Yosemite and Yellowstone National Park, along with the other
eleven national parks, were placed under the administration of a single director within the
Department of the Interior. With a structured salary and complete authority, the
Director’s job was to “promote and regulate” the use of the national parks, while acting
on the department’s behalf to “conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects
and the wild life.”94
On the surface, it appeared that the National Park Service represented a victory in
the major battle for protection of the national parks. Indeed, in some ways it was.
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However, within the Organic Act (as the National Park Service Act became known)
appeared an outline of policies that neither changed previous operations of “preservation”
nor defined any of the former stipulations in question. Rhetorical changes from the word
“preserve” to ‘conserve” reflected the utilitarian forces behind the Act itself, while
leaving the parks “unimpaired” was left without any signifying mention as to its meaning.
Instead, emphasis on a new word, “undeveloped”, gave way to a host of various
translations and the associated problems. Park administrators accepted “undeveloped” as
“unimpaired”; a standard that allowed undeveloped land, namely that in the farthest
reaches of the parks, to be seen as unimpaired and in “pristine” condition. The
inaccessible and often un-extraordinary backcountry was the “evidence” that the national
parks were being “preserved”.
Manipulation of wildlife and flora was also not seen as an impairment and, based
on the interpretation of “development”, was legitimized by the Organic Act itself.95
Although not considered a new practice, park rangers continued the extensive predator
control efforts started almost twenty years earlier by the army. The “destruction of such
animals and of such plant life deemed detrimental to the use” of the parks was carried out
nonchalantly by park volunteers and rangers. This mode of “preservation” was not based
on biological science or research, and without the use of such information resulted in
complete natural resource manipulation and destruction. Sections 3 and 4 of the Organic
Act made virtually no changes to the previous practices of resource management; the
“multiple use” policy remained in effect, and moved the definition of “preservation”
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farther away from that of “pristine natural reserves.” It emulated what Congress intended
by “unimpaired.”96
Clearly, the Organic Act failed drastically on numerous accounts, working only to
ensure that nothing threatened to “interfere with free access to [natural curiosities,
wonders, or objects of interest] by the public.” The National Park Service had been
successfully born, but came equipped with no more of a consensus on how to manage the
parks than existed thirty years earlier.
The years following the birth of the National Park Service served as a time of
experimentation for the appropriate use and purpose of the parks. With development and
natural resource management as primary goals, it was accepted by park administrators
that the latter would serve a dual purpose: to boost the tourism market and provide for a
tightly joined system of efficient and economically sound management.97 In a testimony
given by Secretary Fisher during a hearing for the Committee on Public Lands, he
asserted that along with their development, “national parks should be managed with a
view to preserving their scenic interest.”98 Although few historians have suggested that
preservation began its evolution during the early years of the National Park Service, the
strong undertone of utilitarianism in the Organic Act and the use of the parks in the future
prove otherwise.
With development as the ultimate goal, the fine line between manipulation and
improvement crossed with unimpaired preservation. Park rangers were systematically
ordered to clear the “dead and decaying timber…away from the roads to a distance of
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100 feet”, thin the trees, and introduce grasses and shrubbery to “beautify the roadside
and induce game to show themselves.”99 Park rangers went even further to introduce
nonnative plants, fish, shrubs, trees, and grasses—the species of which were chosen
based on what public viewers considered beautiful. The protection of popular species,
such as deer and certain fish, resulted in the near-extermination of undesirable predators,
which included cougar, wolf, coyote, lynx, bobcat, fox, badger, mink, weasel, fisher,
otter, and marten. These animals were considered “impairments” to visitor enjoyment,
and rangers legitimately proceeded with their discriminatory obliteration of flora and
fauna.100 Methods such as these lent to a new concept of “preservation”, and also created
unclear interpretations between what were appropriate uses of national parks.101
The national parks were victim to confusion for several more years until finally,
in 1918, Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane noticed the problems occurring within
the new National Park Service. Lane wrote a critical letter regarding the management of
the parks, which served as a guidebook of recommendations to which future park
administrators could look for proper management advice. Within his letter he included
details regarding grazing restrictions, land holdings, leases, campground sizes, the
building of roads and hotels, and even offered qualifications of what was to be considered
“national park” status. Lane insisted that national parks be maintained in absolutely
unimpaired condition (a term which he, too, failed to define), while being set apart for
use, observation, health and pleasure of the people.102 Emphasis was placed on the
importance of national interest in dictating all decisions affecting public or private
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enterprise in the parks.103 Still, Lane was driven by utilitarianism, and although he
upheld the need to abolish private land holdings within national parks (many which
existed since the early 19th century), he simultaneously encouraged taking advantage of
land leases to major benefactors—most notably the railroad companies. His toleration
for cattle grazing within park boundaries was nothing more than a silent testimony to the
influence of the cattle industry in the early 20th century. Clearly influenced by Mather,
Lane focused primarily on tourism and outdoor sports in the parks, and openly
encouraged motorcycles and automobiles as new avenues to increase park visitation.
The most important aspect of Lane’s letter, however, was his suggestion of
“national park” criteria. When Yellowstone Park was created in 1872, park specifications
centered on extraordinary curiosities, wonders, or geological interests, but no written
record existed to define the “wonderful freaks of physical geography”—or their
management.104 Without any idea of what was considered national park quality, park
administrators refrained from ‘actively [seeking] the creation of new national parks”.
Great care was instead taken to “develop and administer all such reservations accepted by
Congress and entrusted to its care” as of the current status.105 Congressmen and park
officials endorsed the new objective, most with the firm belief that there were too many
parks already.106 However, by the time Lane had written his letter in 1918, public
perceptions of national parks had changed dramatically. By the late teens and early
1920s, people wanted more, not less, parks, but were left without a consensus of what
was “park worthy”. In an article written for the New York Times on July 4, 1936,
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Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes announced that while “there must be no wasteful
extravagance” in creating national parks, “the number of national parks [was] entirely too
small.”107 Lane stressed that new parks were to contain “scenery of supreme and
extraordinary or unique as to be of national interest and importance.” These
“distinguished examples of…world architecture” were not to be substandard wilderness,
but wonderful examples with amazing quality, regardless of the size. He warned that the
quality and standard of national parks and the Park Service would decline if the
aforementioned provisions were not followed.
Lane’s warning appeared to be based on substantial evidence. By 1917 and 1918,
the parks had lost a significant amount of support as the emerging World War I gained
national priority. The public arena became increasingly unsure how to receive the new
park system and as the war ensued, resentment began to build towards the parks because
of the vast amounts of valuable—and untouchable—natural resources. Ranching
industries claimed parklands were necessary for cattle grazing in order to provide food
for American troops, while mining industries sought mineral deposits and metals for
manufacturing weapons. The war made it increasingly difficult for the National Park
Service to find support among the American public, and discovered few men were
willing to stay and protect the parks over their country.108 The parks were facing another
period of crisis.
With demands for natural resources increasing, the number of sabotage bills
directed at parks grew substantially. In 1919, four separate attempts, directed at
Yellowstone National Park, were proposed for extensive water projects. Advocated by
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Idaho Irrigation, the four plans proposed converting the Fall and Bechler Rivers into
dams and reservoirs in order to supply water to eastern Idaho. The company argued that
the land in question was nothing but a “worthless swamp”, while records from a survey
performed the same year by the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries described it as “one of the most
beautiful, if not the most beautiful valleys in all the park.”109 Manipulations of the truth
and lies were neither uncommon nor infrequent, and although Congress rejected the
proposals, the underlying motive was all too clear: parks were cheap, tax-free
government lands upon which incredible wealth could be accrued.
Development for tourism purposes continued to provide a parallel function of the
national parks, and from 1916 to 1920, administrators faced a new problem: the
increasing popularity and use of automobiles over horses. Tourism by means of car
meant the creation of a better, more extensive road system, and added another stage in the
role roads played in national park history. Hiram M. Chittenden, Superintendent of
Yellowstone during the late 1890s and early 1900s, voiced his concerns about early road
development when he wrote, “The true policy of the government…should…be to make
the roads as limited in extent as will meet actual necessities, but to make those found
necessary perfect examples of their class.”110 Later successors heartedly endorsed making
the backcountry of national parks accessible by horse or foot only, thus restricting the
impact of roads in the parklands. However, like other superintendents and administrators,
Chittenden’s wholesome intentions accompanied the assumption that “highways [were]
least objectionable of all forms of artificial changes in natural condition,” and were not a
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bad form of park development.111 The necessity of roads was obvious and crucial, yet the
demand for suitable roadways exemplified an emerging problem.
With nearly half a century of park development behind the National Park Service,
the question was no longer how to develop the parks, but how to prevent
overdevelopment. When the National Park Service announced its standard, “For
adequate development, but against further confusing ensued.112 Overdevelopment was
too broad of a statement to grasp, and “satisfactory development” remained an enigma.
Overdevelopment was clearly bad, but “if there were no development, no roads or trails,
no hotels or camps, a national park would be merely a wilderness not serving the purpose
for what it was set aside, not benefiting the general public.”113 The conference speaker
Roger W. Toll, the acting Superintendent of Rocky Mountain National Park, commented
that “not all of Nature’s treasures are to be seen from the seat of an automobile; one does
not receive at twenty miles an hour, the inspiration that results from a pilgrimage on
foot.” Roads had become the most visible form of overdevelopment.
Although roads were imperative for visitor transportation within the parks, Toll
suggested park administrators focus on the creation of inaccessible areas, places of
solitude to awake the deep senses and thoughts only found away from the noise and hum
of cars. “The national parks should be a real factor in the building of a better, stronger
race,” he stated. Parks must have areas left in their “natural, wild condition”, while
others would be fully and partly developed. This compromise on the issue of roads and
development in the form of “variety” stood to serve the desires and needs of different
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social classes and visitors. Democracy, again, was silently helping to shape the national
parks.
By 1923, the National Park Service goal was to “build up within the Park Service
the capability to provide services and maintenance and to improve the quality of the
experience a visitor could have in a park.”114 Two years later, on March 11, 1925,
Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work issued a Statement of National Park Policy.
Within the memorandum, Secretary Work commented on the “changed conditions since
the establishment…of the National Park Service,” therefore finding it advisable to
“restate the policy governing the administration of the national park system.” He partly
reiterated the same suggestions made by Secretary Lane, but added a new approach to
nature management.
Contained within Work’s letter were several smaller changes, mostly concerning
the ban on cattle grazing, restructured leases, and the elimination of private holdings.
What was crucial about Work’s letter was his suggestion to use trained landscape
engineers to assist with the designing and building of roads, trails, buildings, and other
park facilities. The emergence of science-based research in the 1920s revealed the
harmful effects of old preservation on the environment, and called for new preservation
standards, which allowed the national parks to “remain under Nature’s own chosen
conditions”.115 Secretary Work was deeply aware of the impact the Park Service could
have on the United States as a country and recognized that such a system, so “unequaled
for grandeur”, needed to be maintained and preserved. Work upheld Secretary Lane’s
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desired that new parks “measure up to the dignity, prestige, and standard of those already
established.”116
On the verge of change, another grappling issue compromised the National Park
Service. When the Interior Department formally added recreation to its two-pronged
mission of environmental and historic preservation in the 1930s, the three missions
experienced large amounts of conflict. With the addition of historic preservation under
the Antiquities Act of 1906, the Interior Department became the recipient of enormous
amounts of land. The addition of recreation, although a fundamental mission since the
early 1900s, posed a direct threat to the preservation of these accumulated parklands.
Unable to appropriately satisfy the calling of all three missions without producing
conflicting results, the Interior Department experienced a severe setback in the
advancement towards preservation.
On the other hand, it is important to note that an outstanding achievement was
reached during the mid-1930s. The Department of the Interior was no more organized or
efficient than it was in previous years, and major aspects of the National Park Service
were located within random departments, the two largest being the Department of
Agriculture and War. Each department continued to exercise control over specific
sectors related to the Park Service. Not only was the entire arrangement outrageously
expensive to operate, but the scattered responsibilities made little sense to park
administrators. Encouraged by H.M. Albright in 1932 and 1933, President Franklin
Roosevelt called for the reorganization of the Interior Department—an action that would
save nearly $25,000,000 annually. The Reorganization Act was finally passed by
116
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Congress and signed by Roosevelt in 1933, resulting in the relocation and consolidation
of all administrative functions of public buildings, reservations, national parks, national
monuments, and national cemeteries into an Office of National Parks, Buildings, and
Reservations.117 By reorganizing the Department of the Interior, both the government and
the public had officially recognized the need for systematic management.
The symbolism of the 1933 Reorganization Act reflected a far more important
aspect. The realization of the continued state of disorder—a condition not necessarily
fixed but improved by the establishment of the National Park Service—was the first step
towards understanding how parks should be maintained. Subsequent efforts made
through Secretary Lane’s and Hubert Work’s letters, as well as the conference on
Overdevelopment, furthered the emerging value of proper park management and
preservation standards. Yet, the Reorganization Act was the final corner stone in a period
of transformation and changing views of the parks, and brought the park system closer to
the ideal mission rooted within the National Park System.

The Past & Present: The National Parks
Few people hesitate to criticize the 21st century National Park Service, but as
people continue to gaze with naive fondness upon the Park Service, the battle over use
and preservation persists. Contemporary issues such as the push for all terrain vehicles
(ATVs) and snowmobiles in the national parks fulfill the recreation mission of the
National Park Service, but directly contradict the environmental preservation aspect. Still
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viewed as a source of tourism and recreation, the problems existing in today’s park
system are direct products of the past.
Regardless of its traumatic past, it is a testament to the National Park Service and
the nation that the parks survived through a Civil War, a World War, the Depression and
Dust Bowl, and above all, a country struggling to find its niche in the large dominion of
nationhood. The struggle between resources exploitation for economic wealth and
keeping the lands unimpaired for future generations has plagued park administrators
since 1872. Through endless eras of failed administration and experimentation for proper
management, the parks suffered enormous amounts of damage, balancing on the edge of
virtual destruction. Unfortunately, time has revealed that park preservation will continue
to be compromised as long as the National Park Service employs the triple mission of
environmental preservation, historic preservation, and recreation.
It is amazing to realize the complexity of national park history, having been
created before America was fully ready to undertake such a responsibility. As a result,
preservation—the core reason for their establishment—was interpreted not as
environmental protection, but as a means for safeguarding America’s impressive
landscapes for the enjoyment of future generations.
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